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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The campaign to ban Muslim religious law, known as Sharia, in American 
courtrooms argues that judicial accommodation of any religious law is inappropriate 
in an American secular courtroom. At first blush, the argument seems to have 
merit—the idea of religious law in a secular liberal democracy seems to f ly in the face 
of our rule of law. It seems to contrast with the principle of equality, which states 
that we all (regardless of race, status, or religion) are held to the same rules. In the 
United Kingdom, the sentiment is summed up in a campaign titled “One Law for 
All.”1 Here in the United States, the argument appears as the title of the latest 
iteration of Sharia-ban legislation: “American Law for American Courts.”2 The idea 
is simple: all Americans should be bound by the same American laws. This seems to 
be an unassailable principle—until one looks more closely at American law itself.
 First, “American law” is not one law; it differs from state to state, and federalism 
protects this diversity. Much of an American citizen’s life is controlled not by uniform 
federal law, but by different state laws, which change every time she crosses a state 
border, and legal principles like comity facilitate mutual state respect for these 
different laws. Comity also extends to judicial accommodation of foreign law when 
relevant, such as in the adjudication of a contract with a foreign choice of law clause. 
And even beyond this, litigating parties in America are regularly encouraged to use 
alternative dispute resolution to resolve their disputes out of court, often producing 
results that are significantly different than those which would have resulted under 
straight judicial application of “American law.”
 Separate from state law, the American rule of law has always considered issues of 
accommodations of religious minorities seeking to follow rules that differ from 
American secular legal norms. In other words, Sharia is by no means the first 
religious law to be presented in American courts. Two centuries of case law involving 
religious-based requests from American Catholics, Jews, Mormons, Native 
Americans, and others has resulted in several established policies and practices that 
American judges use to adjudicate requests for consideration of religious law. In 
short, requests for consideration of religious law are balanced with constitutional and 
legislative principles, using judicial tools such as comity, public policy, and 
unconscionability.3 Because many Americans are unaware of this established practice, 
the anti-Sharia campaign has been able to create a concern that judicial consideration 
of Sharia-based claims from Muslim American litigants is compromising American 
law and values. The case law, however, shows a different picture. Judicial treatment 
of Sharia requests is not threatening the American rule of law, it is an illustration of 
1. See One L. for All, www.onelawforall.org.uk/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
2. See the legislation promoted by the American Public Policy Alliance. Am. Pub. Pol’y Alliance, 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=122 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
3. For a summary of the current practice, with a commentary on how this judicial approach could be 
improved (by expanding the application of unconscionability and limiting the application of public 
policy), see Michael Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting 
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231 (2011).
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it. As with requests from other American religious groups, sometimes Sharia requests 
win, and sometimes they don’t. Reasonable minds differ over whether the courts get 
it right each time. But in every case, the job of the judge is a careful balancing of 
rights against each other, not an automatic trumping of religious practice by secular 
law or vice versa.
 The campaign to ban Sharia in the United States appears to be directed at two 
different alleged threats: (1) that Sharia will take over American law, and (2) that 
judicial accommodation of Muslim religious practices is eroding our secular rule of 
law. The first is a non-issue: there is no real chance that Sharia will replace American 
law or our Constitution. But the second is worth talking about. It asks a question 
crucial to the nature of our secular constitutional democracy: Can we legally 
accommodate a diversity of religious legal practices among our citizens and, if so, 
with what limits?4 I will address one aspect of this question by summarizing in Part 
II how Islamic family law5 is currently accommodated in American courtrooms today 
and discussing in Part III why this does not threaten women’s rights or our American 
rule of law. In Part IV, I consider the global and domestic implications of Muslim 
American tribunals serving the dispute resolution needs of American Muslims. Part 
V concludes.
ii. thE aCCOMMOdatiOn Of isLaMiC faMiLY Law in aMEriCan COUrtrOOMs
 A. Legal Validity of Religious Marriages and Divorces
 Looking over the field of cases involving Islamic family law issues, there are 
several recurring topics.6 One is the validity of Islamic marriages and divorces 
themselves.7 Because civil and religious marriages have different rules, some Muslim 
couples perform a religious ceremony, but do not obtain a marriage license from the 
4. This is not a simple question. It brings up compelling and complex issues of legal and political theory, 
none of which I have the space to engage here. For a recent publication collecting commentary on the 
question with direct reference to the question of Sharia in the West, see generally Shari’a in the West 
(Rex Adhar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010).
5. My focus here is Islamic family law as it is addressed in American courts, not the substantive doctrines of 
Islamic family law itself. The latter is a much larger topic than there is room for here, but for a good 
summary, see Kecia Ali, Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrines, in The Islamic 
Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law 11 (Asifa Quraishi & Frank Vogel 
eds., 2008).
6. A useful website documenting major American cases addressing Sharia, with brief case summaries and 
some commentary, is the “Sharia Index,” maintained by Abed Awad and Noura Jebara. See Sharia in 
America: The Role of Shari’a Law in U.S. Courts, http://shariainamerica.com (last visited Sept. 
18, 2012).
7. There are several cases involving the legitimacy of marriages and divorces conducted in foreign Muslim-
majority countries. I do not detail those here because they usually center on questions of comity to the 
law of foreign jurisdictions more than the question of American consideration of Sharia, which I believe 
is the more relevant question for most American Muslims and the issue presented by the anti-Sharia 
campaign.
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state. If this happens for a polygamous marriage8 or the marriage of a minor child,9 
the state will not recognize these marriages as valid as a general matter of public 
policy. Outside of these situations, the legal validity of a religious marriage will 
depend upon the jurisdiction. In some states, a marriage without a license is void; in 
others, it is voidable, leaving the possibility that with evidence of a “putative marriage” 
(defined on secular terms) it may nevertheless be found valid.10
 Purely religious divorces, on the other hand, are not recognized by state law 
because states claim exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over marriage dissolution. 
This means that a divorce that is valid under Islamic law, but does not comport with 
state law, will not usually be considered a legal divorce and, most importantly, will 
not affect the state’s legal dissolution of the parties’ financial matters.11 This is 
especially relevant to Muslim religious divorces because, of the three types of divorces 
recognized in Islamic law (talaq, khul’, and faskh12), two can occur extra-judicially 
with no one other than the couple involved at all. One of these two extra-judicial 
divorces, talaq, does not even involve the wife. Under classical Islamic law, a talaq 
divorce can be performed unilaterally by a husband with just a declaration of words 
and without the consent or participation of the wife. Talaq divorces have been rejected 
as against public policy by some American judges because of their lack of due process 
and their unequal treatment of the wife.13 Public policy also guides consideration of 
gendered (and patriarchal) child custody and guardianship rules found in Islamic 
family law: they are honored only if they are found to be consistent with the “best 
interests of the child” standard demanded by public policy.14
8. The marriage of the first wife may be recognized, but not those of women married after the first. For 
commentary on this phenomenon, and the disadvantages in which it places “later wives,” see Asifa 
Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States, in 
Women’s Rights and Islamic Family Law: Perspectives on Reform 179, 192–94 (Lynn Welchman 
ed., 2004).
9. See, e.g., People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1976) (charging the defendant with 
endangering the welfare of a child by arranging the minor child’s marriage).
10. See, e.g., Vryonis v. Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712, 722 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding invalid a religious 
marriage without evidence of public representations of married life).
11. A recent example is Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, 719 S.E.2d 192 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), in which the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals recognized a couple’s Muslim marriage, but not their Muslim religious 
divorce. 719 S.E.2d at 194–95; see also Abed Awad & Noura Michelle, Appeals Court Had the Chance to 
Do Right by a Wife and Children—But Declined It, N.C. Law. Wkly. (Dec. 26, 2011), available at http://
nclawyersweekly.com/2011/12/23/appeals-court-had-the-chance-to-do-right-by-a-wife-and-children-
–-but-declined-it/ (arguing that the result was consistent with state law, but that the dissenting opinion 
would have better served justice without unsettling the law of the land that religious divorces do not 
legally dissolve marriages under state law).
12. See Ali, supra note 5, at 23.
13. See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 502 (Md. 2008) (holding that a talaq that was allowed in Pakistan 
was unenforceable in Maryland because, by being accessible only to men and not to women, talaq was 
against public policy under the Equal Rights Amendment of the Maryland Constitution, and also deprived 
women of the due process they would be entitled to when they initiate a divorce in Maryland).
14. See, e.g., Malik v. Malik, 638 A.2d 1184 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). The court remanded the case, 
noting that both Pakistan and Maryland had jurisdiction, and that it would be rare for the second home 
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 B. Enforcement of Mahr
 The most commonly litigated Islamic family law issue in American courts is 
probably mahr. A mahr is an agreement for a specified gift from a groom to the bride, 
and is a necessary clause of any valid Muslim marriage contract. The substance of 
the mahr itself can be anything of value agreed upon by the couple, and can range 
significantly in nature—from a small token of little monetary value, to jewelry or 
other personal property, to thousands of dollars or a piece of real estate. The mahr 
that a couple agrees upon will depend largely on their individual desires and social 
context. A mahr is often divided into two portions—one given at the time of the 
wedding and a later portion deferred to a later event, usually the death of the husband 
or divorce of the parties.
 There are different theories about the concept and purpose of the mahr.15 One of 
its legal consequences is to designate and preserve some independent property for 
married women, which might be quite important for women who want to maintain 
their financial independence but choose not to pursue a career outside the home. A 
large deferred mahr can also deter husbands from divorcing wives who do not wish to 
be divorced because a man who divorces his wife by unilateral talaq must pay the full, 
deferred mahr at that time.
 Because the mahr is often a financial sum—and sometimes a quite significant 
sum—it can become a crucial and often contentious element during negotiations of 
the dissolution of assets during a divorce. Requests for judicial enforcement of mahr 
bring up an interesting aspect of American judicial treatment of Sharia claims 
because, as a clause of a contract, mahr claims invoke an important principle of 
American law: freedom of contract. Because of the importance of the meeting of the 
minds in American contract law, most state judges treat a mahr clause as they do any 
other contract clause; it is enforced unless: (1) it violates some basic rule of contract 
law (e.g., the contract terms are unclear or there is coercion), or (2) its application 
would violate public policy. The fact that the clause itself was inspired by religious 
law is usually irrelevant to this larger respect for contractual intent. In the words of 
one New Jersey judge,
why should a contract for the promise to pay money be less of a contract just 
because it was entered into at the time of an Islamic marriage ceremony? . . . 
Clearly, this Court can enforce a contract which is not in contravention of 
established law or public policy . . . . If this Court can apply “neutral principles of 
state to assume jurisdiction where a party disobeyed a custody order imposed by the first home state, 
with an exception if the Pakistani court did not apply the best interest of the child standard. Id. at 
1191–92. The court further noted that Pakistan’s preference toward paternal custody was not necessarily 
against Maryland public policy—being similar to the now-outdated Maryland maternal preference, but, 
to be granted comity, the husband would have to prove that the Pakistani court exercised a best interest 
of the child standard in reaching its decision. Id. at 1191.
15. For some commentary, see Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 8, at 206.
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law” to the enforcement of a Mahr Agreement, though religious in appearance, 
then the Mahr Agreement survives any constitutional implications.16
Thus, American judges often give respect to a mahr clause as a matter of simple 
contract law. Sometimes American Muslim couples write their mahr clauses with 
very ambiguous, unclear terms, often resulting in their mahr clause not being 
enforced. For example, a mahr for “a ring advanced and half of husband’s possessions 
postponed ” was not enforced because the court concluded that this language left too 
much of the financial calculations unclear.17 Another aspect of basic contract law 
that can prove fatal to a mahr clause is coercion: American judges have declined to 
enforce mahr clauses if they conclude there was coercion or a lack of understanding 
by one of the parties.18
 In one case, the California Court of Appeals declined to enforce a mahr agreement 
(despite its clear terms) because the court considered it to be a mechanism for the 
wife’s “profiteering by divorce” and, therefore, it was against public policy (similar to 
the state’s public policy against enforcing prenuptial agreements that “facilitate 
divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in the event of such an 
occurrence”).19 It might be noted that, in the written opinion, this court displayed an 
incomplete understanding of classical Islamic law regarding deferred mahr because it 
is not always the case that a wife will receive her mahr when she initiates a divorce. 
To the contrary, unlike talaq divorces initiated by the husband, in khul’ and faskh 
divorces that are usually initiated by the wife, it is often the case that the wife ends 
up forfeiting her mahr as a part of the dissolution.20 Thus, the court’s comments 
16. Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95, 97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see also Aziz v. Aziz, 488 
N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1985) (awarding $5,000 deferred mahr “enforceable as a 
contractual obligation, notwithstanding that it was entered into as part of a religious ceremony”); Akileh 
v. Elchahal, 666 So.2d 246, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the essential terms of the marriage 
contract, considered as a prenuptial agreement, to be met, and awarding the wife $50,000 in deferred 
mahr).
17. Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 
July 10, 1995) (finding it unproblematic as a matter of state law to enforce a mahr agreement, but 
nevertheless declining to enforce it in this particular case because of vague language).
18. In re Marriage of Obaidi & Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787, 790–91 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (declining to 
enforce a mahr agreement on neutral principles of contract law, namely, lack of mutual assent); Zawahiri 
v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008) (judging a 
Muslim marriage contract as a prenuptial agreement and denying enforcement of the mahr provision 
because facts demonstrated overreaching and coercion).
19. In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872–73 (Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted) (noting the 
Jewish kethuba also facilitated divorce).
20. See Ali, supra note 5, at 23–24. From my reading of the court opinion, this misunderstanding was partly 
created by exaggerated claims about Islamic family law made by the attorneys on both sides. First, the 
husband’s lawyer insisted that a mahr is awarded only when a husband initiates a divorce. This is a 
partial truth; in classical Islamic family law, a wife is generally awarded her mahr even if she initiates a 
faskh divorce, as long as sufficient grounds of harm (from husband to wife) are shown. Instead of 
clarifying this point, the wife’s lawyer in this case made the equally exaggerated claim that a wife is 
entitled to her mahr regardless of who initiates the divorce. That is, again, a partial truth; it is true of 
faskh divorces where harm is shown, but it is not generally true in wife-initiated khul ’ divorces, for 
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about mahr being a “profiteering” mechanism reveal that its policy decision not to 
accommodate Sharia was based on a basic misunderstanding of mahr. Nevertheless, 
this case serves as a useful illustration of a basic principle underlying all judicial 
treatment of Muslim marriage contracts in the United States: when a Sharia-based 
claim is found to violate public policy, it is not enforced. This is an important 
assurance for anyone concerned that judicial accommodation of Sharia-based claims 
is causing our legal system to enforce religious practices that offend American law 
and values. The case law illustrates how the public policy control is set up to assure 
this does not happen.
iii.  a brOadEr sharia piCtUrE: sharia disCOUrsE in aMEriCa and thE issUE 
Of wOMEn’s rights
 Viewed together, these cases show that, when considering Sharia-based requests 
in their courtrooms, American judges neither react with an automatic rejection of 
Sharia, nor do they give it wholesale deference without considering public policy and 
general constitutional principles. Yet the campaign to ban Sharia in American courts 
insists that the status quo does not go far enough. Bills to ban Sharia take the 
approach that, rather than rejecting individual Sharia-based requests when they 
violate public policy, judges should always view Sharia with suspicion. This comes 
from a presumption that Sharia is itself contrary to American law and values and, 
some even argue that it is a political-military movement set out to take over the 
world.21 Most Americans dismiss the “Sharia-as-world-takeover” warning as rhetorical 
exaggeration, but, nevertheless, the idea that Sharia-as-Islamic-law is generally a bad 
idea—especially for women—does resonate with many Americans. This is important 
because few Americans have any appreciation for either how Sharia might be seen as 
a positive force in Muslim lives, or what a Sharia ban could mean for American 
Muslims. I believe there are several important, largely overlooked, features of Sharia, 
and especially its role in women’s rights, that merit brief attention.
 First, it should be clarified that Sharia itself is not a uniform monolithic code of 
legal rules, but instead is manifested in several different schools of law. From the 
perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, Sharia is the perfect Law of God, but the specific 
rules that are extrapolated from scripture are a human creation. These humanly 
reasons quite similar to the public policy concerns expressed by the California appellate court—namely, 
that if a woman pursues a divorce even where the husband is not at fault, then she should not get a 
windfall of the deferred mahr. What the California court did not appreciate (apparently based on the 
exaggerated argument from the wife’s attorney) was that in the case of a faskh Islamic divorce, a wife 
might be seeking divorce because of harm from her husband, in which case the mahr is not a mechanism 
for “profiteering” by divorce, but rather a mechanism for having the financial independence sufficient to 
support herself once she is able to get out of an unfortunate marriage (especially important if she was 
financially dependent upon him during the marriage).
21. For example, the original Tennessee Sharia ban legislative proposal (before it was amended) defined 
Sharia as a “legal-political-military doctrine . . . requir[ing] the abrogation, destruction, or violation of 
the United States and Tennessee Constitutions and the imposition of Sharia through violence and 
criminal activity.” S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2011), available at http://www.
capitol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Bill/SB1028.pdf.
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created legal rules, called “ fiqh” (literally, “understanding”), multiplied with the 
diversity of Muslim jurists over time. Yet, because of the ever-present possibility of 
human error none could claim with certainty to have the correct understanding of 
God’s Law as against all others. Therefore, all scholarly efforts to articulate the rules 
of Sharia must be accepted, creating a multiplicity of fiqh schools (and their 
corresponding legal doctrines) from which individual Muslims can choose as they 
seek to live by Sharia.22
 Second, the Sharia-ban campaign often quotes some “offensive” fiqh rules to argue 
that Sharia oppresses women and is therefore antithetical to American values.23 For 
those unfamiliar with Islamic jurisprudence, this argument sounds damning, 
especially when classical fiqh texts are quoted. But a basic appreciation of the difference 
between Sharia and fiqh reveals the conceptual error in such assertions. Quoting one 
(or even more than one) fiqh rule does not define Sharia any more than quoting Plessy 
v. Ferguson defines the U.S. Constitution.24 After all, it was not the Constitution that 
endorsed the oppression of black schoolchildren in the United States; it was one 
interpretation of the Constitution that did so. Therefore, while there are quite a few 
gender-discriminatory rules in the collections of fiqh, Muslims are not Islamically 
obligated to follow them simply because they exist in the fiqh doctrine. This principle 
is part of the epistemology of fiqh itself: because no fiqh rule can conclusively claim to 
be “the” correct understanding of Sharia, no fiqh rule is—in and of itself—binding on 
any Muslim. Moreover, because the diversity of fiqh interpretations of Sharia continues 
to evolve and grow even today, many Muslim scholars (men and women) are actively 
engaging in creating new fiqh alternatives to many of the gender-specific rules (such 
as unilateral talaq and patriarchal child custody rules).25
 Moreover, Islamic legal reform is not the only answer for those concerned about 
women’s rights under Sharia. It is important to recognize that not all existing fiqh is 
“bad” for women. This goes largely unnoticed by feminists in the West, but there are 
several aspects of classical fiqh that many Muslim women find quite empowering 
22. For more detail on Islamic jurisprudential theory and how it created several different schools of law, see 
generally Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, 
Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 67 (2006).
23. For example, the website Breitbart.com contains an article asserting the following:
Shariah institutionalizes discrimination against women, deprives people of freedom of 
expression and association, criminalizes sexual freedom, and incites hatred and violence 
against people of certain social groups. As manifested in countries officially ruled by 
Islamic law, shariah condones or commands abhorrent behavior, including underage and 
forced marriage, “honor killing” (usually of women and girls) to preserve family “honor,” 
female genital mutilation, polygamy and domestic abuse, and even marital rape.
 Team B, What is ‘Shariah’?, Breitbart (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2010/09/17/
What-Is-Shariah; see also Team B II, The Ctr. for Sec. Policy, Shariah: The Threat to America: 
An Exercise in Competitive Analysis (Oct. ed. 2010), available at http://shariahthethreat.org/.
24. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding separate but equal was constitutional).
25. There are far too many examples to list here, but some examples are noted in Asifa Quraishi, What If 
Sharia Weren’t the Enemy?: Rethinking International Women’s Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, 22 Colum. 
J. Gender & L. 173, 215–25 (2011).
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and important to maintaining their independence and organizing their lives. For 
example, all classical fiqh schools agree that a woman’s property is exclusively her 
own—no one can ever assert any legal claim over it, including all male relatives and 
husbands. Those familiar with women’s rights under common law should recognize 
that this fourteen-hundred-year-old fiqh rule is quite different than the property 
rules that used to apply to American women. Under the common law, women were 
not only limited in their ability to acquire property of their own (for example, through 
restrictions on the ability to contract in their own names), but they also lost separate 
ownership of their property upon marriage when it then became the property of their 
husbands. The adoption of community property principles (borrowed from civil law) 
by some states presented a radical departure from this scheme because these principles 
designated and protected the property that women brought with them into a marriage 
as their own separate property, and gave women ownership interests in the property 
acquired by both the husband and wife during the marriage.26
 When compared to classical Islamic law, however, community property is not 
necessarily a woman-empowering move forward. If you begin from the position that 
a woman’s property is her exclusive property, then community property (by 
transforming all assets and income earned during the marriage into marital property 
shared equally with one’s husband) actually takes away the property rights granted to 
a woman under Islamic law. As an illustration, consider this hypothetical: imagine 
that Leila is a young professional with a high salary and a successful career. Assuming 
that her income would be exclusively her own, upon marriage she opted for a very 
low mahr, figuring that she would not need to rely on it if she were to end up single 
again. If Leila ends up divorcing in a community property state, a marital dissolution 
would award her ex-husband half of all the assets Leila acquired during the marriage. 
This could put her in a financial position far inferior to the one that she was expecting 
under Islamic law (specifically, the principle of exclusive female ownership of 
women’s property), especially if the marital property brought into the marriage by 
her now-ex-husband was very small. From Leila’s perspective, community property 
would not give her more property rights; it would cut them in half.27
 Another provision from classical fiqh that promotes women’s f inancial 
independence upon divorce is the rule that considers a wife’s household work to be 
financially compensable. Under classical fiqh, housework is not a wife’s legal 
obligation, so those who do so can in some cases be financially compensated for this 
26. See Caroline B. Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of the Community Property System, Why 
California Adopted It, and Why Community Property Principles Benefit Women, 11 U. Md. L.J. Race, 
Religion, Gender & Class 1, 2–13 (2011).
27. Had she known of the community property consequences, Leila might have argued for a much larger 
deferred mahr to offset the potential future loss—although, as the cases above illustrate, it is no 
guarantee that an American court will honor a mahr agreement. Alternatively, Leila could have opted 
out of community property with a valid prenuptial agreement, but this solution is not ideal because few 
newlywed couples are fully aware of the legal consequences of community property, much less the state 
in which they will be living if and when they divorce.
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work.28 This rule can have important financial consequences in the dissolution of a 
marriage in which the husband earned a large salary while the wife maintained the 
home. Yet this aspect of fiqh is rarely raised in Muslim family law cases in America. 
Instead, Muslim husbands in these cases often argue that the contractual mahr is the 
sum total of the wife’s rights under Islamic law, and that the wife should receive 
nothing in alimony or through any equitable distribution of property.29 In such cases, 
given the significant financial disadvantage in which this resolution would put the 
wife, many American judges have rejected these purported Sharia arguments as 
against public policy. What is not acknowledged in these cases, however, is that the 
mahr clause of a Muslim marriage contract (unlike a prenuptial agreement) is not 
meant to constitute a full division of property upon divorce under classical fiqh. 
Rather, the mahr is just one part of a complex interconnected network of Islamic 
property laws that could include not only compensation for housework, but also 
women’s exclusive ownership of their property, men’s exclusive financial household 
support obligations, and gendered inheritance laws, to name just a few. Thus, in the 
case of a long-term marriage between a career husband and a stay-at-home wife, a 
Muslim judge might award the wife her mahr, plus compensation for the financial 
value of all of her housework over the course of the marriage (which could amount to 
as much as or perhaps even more than the distribution under state law).
 In other words, even classical fiqh rules can accomplish women-empowering 
goals similar to secular American laws, but they operate within a different framework 
and start from different premises. As a result, it is overreaching to assume that all 
Sharia-based rules offend American legal values of gender fairness. Indeed, rather 
than rescuing them from the gender inequalities of Islamic law, some Muslim women 
might object to the wholesale judicial disregard of Sharia as an intrusion upon their 
rights. Simply put, it is not true that a woman is always financially better off under 
American law than under Islamic law.
iV.  LOOKing fOrward: thE iMpLiCatiOns and LiKELihOOd Of aMEriCan 
MUsLiM tribUnaLs
 There is a hollow mechanical aspect to the way that fiqh rules are depicted in 
American courts. Fiqh is often treated as a static collection of legal rules to be quoted 
and applied regardless of social context and circumstances. But for someone schooled 
in Islamic jurisprudence, it would be awkward and insufficient to simply slice off the 
classical rules from the books and apply them in the considerably different realities of 
28. Alternatively, the husband must hire someone to do it, or do it himself. In the classical fiqh doctrine, 
whether or not a woman was entitled to this compensation might depend on her social class. This 
condition, however, may or may not be considered relevant to limit application of this rule today. Recent 
divorce cases in Iran that awarded women this compensation do not seem to so limit it.
29. Not surprisingly, this is a common legal argument made by the husband if the mahr is quite small in 
comparison to a very large marital estate. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Altayar, No. 57475-2-I, 2007 Wash. 
App. LEXIS 2102, at *1 (Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (finding that a marriage contract containing a mahr of 
nineteen gold coins was not a sufficient substitute for a prenuptial agreement because exchange of mahr 
for equitable property distribution under Washington law was not fair).
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life in twenty-first century America. Fiqh lawmaking and adjudication requires not 
just knowledge of the scripture and the doctrinal rules extrapolated from that 
scripture, but also knowledge of the social context in which the rules are to be 
applied. Thus, where social context changes, the fiqh often changes as well. Further, 
Muslim judges also consider the practical consequences of applying a fiqh rule in a 
given case.30 This brings up a question often asked within the American Muslim 
community: Can Muslims in America access civil institutions that provide religious 
advice, counseling, and dispute resolution from the perspective of Islam in America, 
rather than fiqh rules imported from overseas? As the American Muslim community 
grows and creates its own homegrown Islamic scholars, these civil institutions may 
grow along with it.
 In the arena of dispute resolution, some American Muslims have looked to the 
American Jewish community for inspiration. That community has created a 
successful alternative to presenting Jewish legal arguments in secular courts: the 
Beth Din. As Professor Michael Broyde elucidates in his article, the Beth Din 
arbitration tribunals offer Jewish Americans the option of resolving their disputes 
before arbiters who are experts in both Jewish and American law and are aware of 
the particular social realities of Jewish life in America today.31 Would a Muslim 
arbiter schooled in both Islamic law and American law similarly serve the American 
Muslim community with a more nuanced and contextualized approach to Islamic 
law that applies—perhaps even creates—different fiqh rules than the majority 
opinions of classical fiqh? Possibly. It is by no means a certainty, but it is conceivable 
that if Muslim equivalents of Beth Din tribunals were staffed by creative and 
professionally trained Muslim arbiters,32 a new body of uniquely American fiqh could 
evolve out of these tribunals. Such fiqh could incorporate the realities of modern 
Muslim life in the United States, such as racial equality, religious pluralism, the 
absence of gendered public and private spaces, advanced medical technology, and so 
on.33 These rules would provide powerful alternatives to the stagnant “ fiqh on the 
books” currently quoted to American judges by expert witnesses in their courtrooms.
 The possibility of Muslim American tribunals also provides food for thought for 
Americans interested in supporting human rights and democracy in the Muslim 
world. Those wanting to help “moderate Muslims” prevail over the intolerance and 
30. For more on the role of a Muslim judge, see Asifa Quraishi, On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking 
Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American Constitutional Law, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 339 (2009).
31. See Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons Offered to Sharia Courts by the Beth Din of 
American Precedent, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 287 (2012–2013).
32. This caveat is crucial. The arbiters would have to be qualified to do independent ijtihad (Islamic legal 
reasoning) in order for their fiqh to actively incorporate the relevant American context. Imams who only 
apply existing, outdated fiqh of the classical books would arguably do more harm than good.
33. I am not the first to make this suggestion. Similar thoughts have been expressed by, for example, Anver 
Emon and Faisal Kutty, both writing in the context of the aborted Muslim tribunal project in Canada. 
See Anver M. Emon, Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence and Multicultural 
Accommodation, 87 Can. B. Rev. 391 (2008); Faisal Kutty, The Myth and Reality of “Shari’a Courts” in 
Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7:3 U. St. Thomas L.J. 559 
(2010).
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extremism of radical Muslims around the world might consider this: What if it’s not 
about over there? What if it’s about over here? That is, what if the answer to extremist 
understandings of Sharia is to drown them out with new and different fiqh rules—
rules that are just as authentically Islamic, but born in the open space of a free civil 
society like the United States where the process of legal interpretation can evolve 
naturally and creatively, not stif led by social and political forces? That is, if authentic, 
sophisticated American Muslim tribunals existed in the West, then perhaps some34 
of the new fiqh rules that would emerge from them would reflect American social 
values like gender equality, human rights, and religious freedom. When that fiqh 
goes out into the world, and American Muslim scholar-arbiters interact with Muslim 
judges and scholars from other places, this could have powerful potential for 
contributing to the global evolution of fiqh generally. It also might help facilitate a 
new, authentically Muslim consensus on stalemate issues in international civil, 
human, religious, and women’s rights discourses in ways that most western 
policymakers and social activists have yet to appreciate.
 None of this is likely to happen any time soon, however. I recognize that there is 
simply too much resistance to Sharia (let alone Sharia tribunals) in the current 
American political climate to make this a reality—despite our legal system’s openness 
to religious alternative dispute resolution systems like the Beth Din. For empirical 
evidence, we need look no further than Canada, where the recent planned addition 
of Islamic arbitration tribunals to existing Jewish and Christian tribunals was revoked 
after the announcement sparked public controversy.35 At the moment, negative 
associations with Sharia seem to be too strong in Western minds to leave any room 
for understanding Sharia-based adjudication as a dynamic interpretive process that 
allows for evolution and new fiqh rules. Given this reality, as well as the current 
limited numbers of Islamic legal scholars who also hold an American law degree, we 
are not likely to see the Muslim equivalents of Beth Din tribunals in the near future, 
despite their potential even beyond the litigation needs of American Muslims. For 
now, the status quo continues: American judges evaluate Sharia-based claims 
presented by Muslim parties through expert testimony, and enforce what they 
understand as long as it does not violate public policy.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 Although the principle of “One Law for All”36 has powerful emotional appeal, it 
is simply not the reality of law in the United States. Uniform federal law and the 
Constitution are supreme, but within those boundaries, a great deal of legal diversity 
exists, and American accommodation of religious law, within the limits of public 
34. I say “some” here because I believe that, if these tribunals were to work, the principles of fiqh pluralism 
would have to apply. That is, I do not imagine one central body of arbiters producing one collection of 
new fiqh rules, but rather a diversity of fiqh interpretations ref lecting the different ideologies of the 
arbiters (ranging from conservative to liberal and otherwise) and those of the American Muslim public.
35. See Kutty, supra note 33.
36. See One L. for All, supra note 1.
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policy, has always been part of that diversity. Many have pointed to this American 
tradition with pride, arguing that the United States has a better approach than those 
countries where secularism is coming to mean “assimilationism” and where religious 
diversity is suffocated by aggressive laws restricting religious practices. The anti-
Sharia movement in the United States seeks to similarly narrow the range of religious 
practice legally protected by American courts.
 The question presented by the anti-Sharia movement is therefore not really about 
Sharia. It is about America. It is about what sorts of religious diversity our liberal 
democracy chooses to honor. Will we continue to find ways to legally accommodate 
the many different religious practices of our citizens, even when we don’t quite 
understand or agree with them? Or will we move toward legal uniformity and 
homogeneity and “One Law for All”? Given that America has never been a 
homogeneous society, I hope that we choose the former, honoring individual freedom 
whenever possible, despite the tough cases that will inevitably arise. I believe that 
America is at its best when we find strength in our diversity, and especially when we 
protect the diverse practices of our minorities. I believe our differences exist for us to 
learn from, not to iron out. Muslim families following Sharia are part of that 
diversity. American judicial accommodation of their requests should be something of 
which Americans are proud, not afraid.
